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Christian Teichmann
AUTHOR'S NOTE
*Research for this article was made possible by research grants of Volkswagenstiftung
(Hanover, Germany) and the Hoover Archives Summer Workshop (Stanford, California).
Heartfelt thanks for help and advice are due to Samantha Taber, Johannes Arens and
Philine Apenburg, as well as the patient editors of this special issue, the supportive
anonymous reviewers and the diligent journal editors.
1 “People came into the Vakhsh Valley. Not simple people but Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks,
organized by will, came for victory. They brought technique with them into the steppe.
The technique began to move along the sun‑burnt steppe by means of  its  draglines,
Fordsons, dredges, and workmen camps.”1 With words like these, journalists and writers
hailed the Vakhsh River Valley Project in the many tongues of Soviet propaganda. What
seemed like a fait  accompli  in 1931 newspaper reports,  novels,  feuilletons and public
speeches  was,  nonetheless,  an  agricultural  colonization  project  beset  by  great
technological  obstacles  and  deathly  environmental  risks.  The  valley’s  geographical
isolation in the southernmost periphery of the Soviet Union, the borderlands between the
Tajik  Soviet  Republic  and  Afghanistan’s  Kunduz  Province,  only  compounded  the
challenge that Soviet planners, regional party bosses and irrigation engineers had set for
themselves.
2 Neither  its  geographical  remoteness  nor  its  infrastructural  isolation  separated  the
Vakhsh River Valley Project from other Stalinist shock construction sites of the 1930s. On
the contrary, Soviet economic planners sought to reverse hitherto familiar geographical
hierarchies. They proclaimed that the distant peripheries were to be the new political
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centers and that the invincible natural borders were to be the new frontiers of socialism.2
Widely publicized landmark building projects such as the Magnitogorsk steel plant or the
White Sea Canal—intended to open unexplored landscapes to the exploitation of natural
resources  in  order  to  strengthen  the  country’s  military  capacity—emerged  at
geographically isolated sites with no reliable infrastructure in place.3 At the same time,
the  secret  police  deported  several  hundred  thousand  disenfranchised  peasants  and
city‑dwellers into remote regions for the purpose of agricultural colonization.4
3 In their  interpretations  of  Stalinist  shock construction,  historians  often drew on the
concept of authoritarian modernization. They heeded the Bolshevik battle cry that Soviet
socialism  should  be  understood  as  a  struggle  against  backwardness  and
underdevelopment.  Accordingly,  they presented Stalinist  policies as a radical  utopian
drive towards progress and modernity.5 Despite difficulties and setbacks, construction
projects  eventually  achieved  their  goals  as  new factories,  infrastructures,  and urban
agglomerations  arose  in  previously  barren  peripheries.6 From  this  perspective,  the
transformation  of  societies,  geographies  and  natural  spaces  lent  legitimacy  to  the
Bolshevik project and made it palpable to the peoples of the Soviet Union. Moreover,
through its anti‑capitalist ideology the Stalinist regime constantly generated mobilization
in the new “landscapes of possibility” where construction sites such as Magnitogorsk
became  “powerful  levers  in  the  fight  to  build  socialism.”7 The  Vakhsh  River  Valley
Project,  by  contrast,  experienced  a  different  trajectory.  Malfunctioning  technology,
environmental hazards, mass deportations, and a lack of political legitimacy undercut the
project’s very existence. In May 1937, the Tajik government launched an inquiry into the
state of the irrigation scheme and had to admit that it suffered from an “irregular and
unreliable supply of water.” After seven years of costly construction work and difficult
attempts at  colonization,  the Vakhsh project had transformed the river valley into a
wasteland of salty marshes and swamps. Finally, the People’s Commissariat of Agriculture
in Moscow earmarked the project for “liquidation.”8
4 The  Vakhsh  River  Valley  Project  was  one  of  the  150 prominent  sites  of  “shock
construction of all‑Union importance” during the First Five‑Year Plan.9 Unlike similar
large‑scale irrigation ventures in Stalinist Central Asia—the Great Ferghana Canal of the
late 1930s or the Turkmen Main Canal of the early 1950s—it sank into oblivion outside the
region of its creation. All leading personnel involved in the initial phase of construction
fell victim to the Stalinist purge and terror campaigns between 1936 and 1939. Archivists
destroyed large parts of the documentation.10 When a major technical overhaul of the
Vakhsh irrigation scheme began in 1956, Soviet historians and propagandists invented an
appropriately heroic version of the construction sites’  early days.  This version of the
story shapes local memory up until today.11 Only during the short years of perestroika
were  scholars  in  Tajikistan  able  to  carry  out  thorough  archival  studies  of  Stalinist
colonization policies.12 Their efforts were cut short by the outbreak of the civil war in
Tajikistan when, in 1992, the Vakhsh Valley became a site of military conflict, material
destruction and ethnic atrocities.
5 While the following pages trace the Vakhsh River Valley Project in the decade from its
inception in 1929 to the Soviet entry into World War II, three overarching questions will
be raised. First, the paper asks how Soviet bureaucrats and engineers struggled to manage
a grand construction scheme in an austere and war‑torn landscape. It traces the ways in
which  engineering  expertise  and  agronomical  knowledge  were  nullified  by  stiff
decision‑making hierarchies and widespread state terror. Second, the paper aims to treat
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the natural environment as an actor in its own right, thus seeking to demonstrate how
the forces of nature played out against the initial goals of colonizing and cultivating the
isolated  river  plain.  Third,  it  characterizes  the  ways  in  which  Stalinist  governance
intentionally  deepened,  instead  of  remedying,  the  ongoing  environmental  and  social
crises in the valley. Rather than portraying the Vakhsh project as another key site of
Soviet  modernization,  the  paper  scrutinizes  the  local  consequences  and  legacies  of
violent state building. The Vakhsh Valley Project tells the story of a landscape and its
people  that  remained  outside  the  neat  binaries  of  the  Bolshevik  utopia  and  the
supposedly solid grids of Soviet modernity.
 
The gringos of Tashkent
6 On March 31, 1930, the American engineer Willard Livermore Gorton arrived in Tashkent.
He brought with him two huge trunk suitcases and a rich engineering experience. Born in
1881, he had started his career at the North Platte Project in Wyoming in 1904. Based in
Boise,  Idaho, since  1909,  he  had  continuously  worked  in  the  field  of  irrigation  and
reclamation. “My work covers the investigation, design, construction and operation of
irrigation works,” Gorton wrote when applying to be employed by the Soviet government.
In a stroke of luck, Gorton’s application was facilitated by the renowned constructor of
the Panama Canal, Arthur Powell Davis, who already was working at the time in Tashkent
as a Chief Consulting Engineer of the Central Asian Water Administration.13
7 When Gorton embarked on the Soviet Ark in 1930, his prospects looked exceptionally
promising. Arthur Davis informed him that the Soviet government was planning “a very
ambitious  irrigation program,”  which involved spending “over  100,000,000 rubles  per
annum during the next 6 or 8 years.” Moreover, “a project for irrigating 465,000 hectares
of raw land has been under investigation for many years, and this has been ready for
construction for two years,” Gorton read in Davis’ inviting letter. “It is possible that they
are  considering  placing  this  construction  under  your  charge.”14 Like  thousands  of
American and European professionals at the onset of the Great Depression, Gorton chose
to try his luck with the Bolsheviks both out of necessity and curiosity.15 “Whatever else
their governmental scheme is,” he wrote to a fellow American engineer in an atmosphere
of departure, “it is most assuredly a great social experiment.”16 
8 Upon his arrival in Tashkent, Gorton soon discovered that the advertised Hungry Steppe
Project  in  Uzbekistan  had  “gone  cold”  after  its  Russian  Chief  Engineer,  Georgii
Konstantinovich Rizenkampf, had been arrested by the secret police and disappeared in
the  Belomor  camp.17 Instead  of  overseeing  a  conveniently  located  and  thoroughly
explored construction scheme, Gorton shortly after his arrival found himself sitting in an
airplane headed for southern Tajikistan. He was to investigate “a project known as the
Vakhsh,” which was “feverishly being examined” by Soviet engineers in the spring of
1930: 
With  an  optimism  typically  Bolshevik,  and  an  utter  disregard  of  realities,  also
typical  of  the Communists  —Gorton later  sardonically  remarked—, they decided
that  the  job,  involving  the  reclamation  of  250,000 acres  of  land,  should  be
completed in one year.  Only the most preliminary engineering examination had
been made and final surveys and plans were still somewhere in the future. 
9 Yet, Gorton also admitted that at his new job, “it was difficult at times to retain that
objective attitude toward the great experiment.”18
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10 Gorton was not the only one caught up in the feverish atmosphere of the First Five‑Year
Plan. Vasilii Ėmil´evich Sproge arrived in Tashkent approximately at the same time as did
Gorton. A Ukrainian of Swiss descent, Sproge was a son of Russia’s three revolutions: a
graduate of Moscow’s prestigious Railroad Engineering Institute, a committed Kadet, a
soldier of the Voluntary Army during the Civil  War and, after the White’s defeat,  an
enthusiastic  builder  of  the  Dnepr  Hydroelectric  Dam.  His  close  association  with  the
mastermind  of  the  Dnepr  Dam,  Ivan  Gavrilovich  Aleksandrov,  resulted  in  Sproge’s
promotion to the position of a Deputy Director of Dneprostroi in 1926.19 In 1929, Ivan
Aleksandrov moved his team from Ukraine to Moscow and, from his new headquarters,
ran the newly founded State Institute for the Design of Water Works. This institution was,
in Sproge’s words, responsible “for the design of all problems and major projects that
previously  had  been  managed  by  several  different  agencies  in  Central  Asia,  located
mainly  in  Tashkent.”20 Sproge’s  and  Gorton’s  technical  expertise  was  a  valuable
replacement for those prominent engineers who possessed long years of work experience
in Central Asia’s irrigation sector but, in 1930‑31, were being feverishly persecuted by the
secret police.21
11 By the outlandish standards of the First Five‑Year Plan—as demonstrated at Dneprostroi,
Magnitorsk,  Belomor,  and  many  other  shock  construction  sites—the  Vakhsh  Valley
Project was hardly an exceptional case. In Central Asia, however, the political and social
conditions differed significantly from those in the Soviet Union’s Russian core. Here, the
revolutionary war of the Bolsheviks had lasted until 1924 and had had the character of a
colonial conquest.22 Soviet nationality policy, consequently, had failed in its goal to create
stable and locally rooted governmental institutions.23 Instead, until 1934 party politics in
the region were overseen by the Central Asian Bureau, the powerful representative of the
Moscow Central  Committee of  the Communist  Party in  Tashkent,  which also steered
economic and cultural policies.24 Moreover, the turmoil of collectivization and enforced
cotton cultivation was aggravated by crises and instability in the neighboring countries.
In January 1929,  for instance,  the Afghan king and Soviet ally,  Amanullah Khan,  was
toppled and Afghanistan slid into a protracted civil war. The deterioration of the Afghan
state  led  the  Moscow  leadership  to  reconsider  its administration  of  the  southern
borderlands. In November 1929, after five years of lobbying on the part of the Tajiks, the
Moscow Central Committee finally granted the Tajik Autonomous District the breakaway
from Uzbekistan.25
12 The newly established Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic not only needed new ministers, an
appropriate capital city and a state budget but, due to its enhanced political status, it was
also entitled to run its own prestigious construction project. The Chairman of the Tajik
Executive Committee, Nusratullo Maksum, therefore advocated the Vakhsh Valley as a
potential building site. He had good reason to do so. On one hand, the hot climate of the
valley  offered  a  unique  opportunity  to  cultivate  long‑fibred  high‑quality  “Egyptian”
varieties of cotton. This fact provided valuable arguments to enlist the support of the
resource‑hungry Moscow government  for  the  adventurous  irrigation scheme.  On the
other  hand,  the  advocated  scheme  opened  up  the  possibility  for  proactive  Tajik
nation‑building.  Hitherto,  Turkic  nomadic  tribal  peoples  (identified  at  the  time  as
“Uzbeks”  and  “Lakai”)  inhabited  the  plains  of  the  Vakhsh  Valley.  By  contrast,  the
Persian‑speaking sedentary groups (identified as “Tajiks”) were a tiny ethnic minority in
the southern lowlands. In the minds of Chairman Maksum and his Tajik comrades, the
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Vakhsh Valley Project provided a unique chance to redraw the ethnic balance sheet in the
southern plains and to revamp their mountain republic into a truly Tajik country.26
13 Engineers like Sproge and Gorton were hardly in a position to apprehend this situation.
Being  newcomers  to  Central  Asia,  they  lacked  a  clear  understanding  of  the  murky
political landscape and complex social realities of the region. Instead, the two men were
preoccupied with time‑consuming struggles with the Soviet bureaucracy over payment
delays, food provisioning and poor working conditions. Due to his privileged status as a
foreign expert, Gorton freely criticized the Vakhsh Valley scheme because of its isolated
location,  inadequate  survey  data  and  general  unpreparedness.  Still,  his  technical
expertise was decisive for the planning of  the future irrigation scheme.27 Meanwhile,
Sproge and his Soviet colleagues conducted a number of reconnaissance missions all over
Central  Asia  between  1930  and  1932.  In  his  memoirs,  Sproge  pondered  the  “totally
impossible and unpredictable weather conditions” and the “constant danger to fall into
the hands of native rebels and be tortured to death by them.”28
14 Despite  their  different  backgrounds,  both engineers  shared similar  attitudes  towards
Central  Asia  and its  people:  while  painting colorful  Orientalist  pictures,  they neither
appreciated nor studied local irrigation techniques and methods. Rather, a combination
of ignorance (“a civilization that hardly changed during the past two thousand years”)
and disdain (“Bolshevik Turkestan is no dirtier than other countries east of the Suez”)
shaped their attitudes when working towards Soviet technological progress.29 Moreover,
the two engineers’ social contacts were limited to fellow professionals and Soviet officials.
Their activities were circumscribed by arbitrary government orders, subject to ad hoc
political decisions, and buffeted by frequent and chaotic change. Engineers experienced
the hardships of “socialistic building” like everyone else. “Russia may be a workman’s
paradise,” Gorton quipped after his return to Boise in 1932, “but it is a (Soviet) engineer’s
hell.”30 Still, the American had a point when recognizing that 
Russian  engineers  work  under  great  difficulties  due  to  the  peculiar  type  of
organization utilized by the Communists whereby every important office, bureau,
or  project,  has  at  its  head  a  Communist,  whose  principal,  and  sometimes  only,
qualification for the position is his knowledge of Communist party ballyhoo.31
 
Burnt by the sun
15 The Vakhsh River cuts through the Pamir Mountains from north‑east to the south‑west
and, at its confluence with the Panj River, forms the Amu Darya. Nineteenth century
sources report that “just to the north of the Kurgan‑Tiube settlement, the Vakhsh River
enters into a plain and diverts into several arms, where it forms low banks covered with
water  reeds  and  a  diversity  of  shrubs.”  On  the  plain,  stretching  approximately
100 kilometers from north to south, the main river stream formed meandering beds on a
width of 170 meters.32 Prior to 1917, geographers portrayed the valley as abundant with
waterways and carpeted with vegetation. The terrain was “barely known” to outsiders,
“sparsely populated,” and the river banks were “overgrown by extensive jungles.”33 Only
a  decade  later,  the  Bolsheviks  saw  the  Vakhsh  Valley  as  little  more  than  a  desert
wasteland. It was not just the hot summers, snowy winters, and downtrodden post‑Civil
War population that shaped their perception.34 The barren landscape represented a dark
past that was to be overcome. Bruno Jasieński, a Polish Communist writer who visited
Tajikistan in 1930 and 1931 with the task of propagandizing the Vakhsh Project in a novel,
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described the construction site in the upper part of the valley as a “huge desert plateau
that is stretched out between two chains of mountains on an area of about two hundred
thousand hectares.” In a rather unsurprising turn of socialist realist dialectics, Jasieński
then  informed  his  readership  that  the  territory  “lends  itself  wonderfully  for  the
cultivation of Egyptian cotton.”35
16 According to Soviet planners, the “combat mission” of the engineers was to construct a
canal network that would allow for the reclamation of 50,000 hectares of desert land
within  three  years.  Plans  eventually  foresaw  the  cultivation  of  more  than
100,000 hectares in the valley. The construction of a concrete sluice over the Vakhsh was
the cornerstone of the project.36 In 1930, Ivan Aleksandrov, the prominent mastermind of
Dneprostroi and influential Director of the Moscow State Institute for the Design of Water
Works,  even advocated the building of  a  hydropower station and the erection of  an
industrial  complex  in  the  southern  parts  of  the  valley  that  directly  bordered  with
Afghanistan.37 The American engineer Willard Gorton, for his part, repeatedly made it
clear to the Soviet authorities that the envisioned construction program was “practically
impossible.”38 Other foreign visitors concurred. Egon Erwin Kisch, an ardent admirer of
the Bolshevik regime and popular journalist in Weimar Germany, was amazed by both the
enthusiasm of the people he encountered during his 1931 visit to the Vakhsh Valley and
by the Bolshevik “phantasmagoria to turn a stone desert parched over thousands of years
into a blooming cotton garden.”39
17 At first glance, the site where the head sluice and main feeder canal were built looked like
any  other  Soviet  shock  construction  site  of  the  early  1930s:  chaos,  scarcity  and
mismanagement reigned wherever observers turned their eyes.40 Willard Gorton noticed
that the “appearance of feverishness” on the construction site was “due to the utter
confusion,  bordering  on  chaos,  which  obtains  practically  everywhere.”41 Although
construction  had  already  started,  the  technical  plans  had  not  yet  been  finalized.
Unsurprisingly, transportation and infrastructure were disorganized: neither roads nor
railroads connected the site to the outside world. Functioning building machinery was
scarce.  Horses  and  camels  died  of  neglect  and  starvation.  The  majority  of  the
7,000 workers and 700 Red Army soldiers on the site lived in tents, yurts, and mud houses
because  wood  for  the  construction  of  barracks  was  unavailable.  Workers  lacked  the
necessary  workwear,  shoes,  and  soap.  Salaries  were  paid  out  irregularly.  Even  a
functioning party organization was missing.42
18 In  the  spring  of  1931,  conditions  further  deteriorated  due  to  hunger  and  war.
“Kurgan‑Tiube sits without grain,” reported the secret police. A caravan of 1,000 camels
tried to cross the mountain range between Stalinabad and the Vakhsh Valley but failed
because mock state functionaries and con party officials demanded road tolls and transfer
royalties. Armed robbers made food deliveries to the valley virtually impossible. By June,
Tajik Prime Minister Abdurakhim Khodzhibaev had to ask the Moscow government to
take over responsibility for  adequate food provisions to the valley.43 To make things
worse, an insurgency broke out when Afghan warlord Ibrahim Bek crossed into Tajikistan
with his sizeable army. He had fought against Soviet rule throughout the 1920s but his
troops had grown from a few dozen warriors in 1929 to 1,200 fighters in 1931. Ibrahim, a
42‑year‑old  Lakai  from  Hissar,  collected  tributes  from  the  population  and  recruited
fighters in the valley and the surrounding lands.44 Alarmed by the deteriorating security
situation, Moscow sent in OGPU Special Troopers under the infamous commander Efim
Georgievich  Evdokimov.  After  two  months  of  ruthless  counterinsurgency  operations,
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Ibrahim was finally  arrested and subsequently shot.  His  fighters  went into hiding.  A
Soviet  holiday  was  celebrated.  Evdokimov  and  his  radicalized  troops  moved  into
Turkmenistan to quell a nomad uprising in Karakum desert. In a continuation of their
counterinsurgency operation, his soldiers used air bombardments and poison gas to end
anti‑Soviet resistance.45
19 Despite massive food shortages and an epidemic of malaria,  new people continuously
arrived in the valley. Some were workers and soldiers recruited in Tashkent to toil on the
construction site. The majority, however, were destitute Kazakh herders trying to escape
famine in their homeland. They used the dangerous passage through the Vakhsh Valley
as a gateway to Afghanistan. Between January and March 1932, more than 1,200 refugee
families were able to flee from Soviet territory despite the massacres and man hunts
employed by Soviet border patrols to prevent them from doing so. Tajik Prime Minister
Abdurakhim  Khodzhibaev  complained  to  the  secret  police  about  the  “masses  of
anti‑Soviet elements” that “roam the border districts” and demanded that the border be
sealed off.46 Amid masses of deprived refugees, disease, and shortages, Soviet officials
could hardly ensure the fulfillment of the construction and cotton sowing plans. “The
reason for the lagging plan fulfillment is that the plans took into account neither the
out‑migration of the population to Afghanistan nor the non‑arrival of new settlers,” Tajik
secret police chief, Ivan Dorofeev, dutifully mused.47
20 How could an ambitious Soviet agricultural development scheme thrive in this situation?
It certainly could not. In late March 1932, a report cabled to Stalinabad from the Lubianka
secret police headquarters in Moscow alerted the Tajik government to the dire state of
affairs: 
The entire territory of  the construction site is  littered with various objects and
materials (tractors, trailers, carts, pieces of metal, ropes, canvases, and so on); the
living conditions for workers are heinous: barracks are leaking and unheated; there
is no hot water, no crockery, and no bathing facilities. 
21 Characteristically for secret police reports of the period, data on the bad state of the
machine outfit  and livestock mortality supplanted any precise information about the
living conditions of the population: only 40 out of 127 cars were in operation, only 15 out
of 28 excavators, only 90 out of 213 tractors; half of the original number of 800 camels had
died as had over 1,000 out of 2,600 horses.48 This devastating result, achieved at a cost of
38 million rubles, was, however, only one in many missteps of shock construction during
the First Five‑Year Plan in the Soviet Union. 
 
A leap in the dark
22 The Tajik Central Committee in Stalinabad now pushed for an “assault to liquidate the
plan backlog” and for a “decisive breakthrough” on the construction site. Lengthy party
resolutions and government orders, however, did nothing to consolidate the construction
site.  Directors came and went.  Repressions by the secret police in the Vakhsh Valley
against “criminal and enemy elements” continued. The food situation did not improve
despite  the  accommodation  of  “Soviet  bazaars”  where  private  trade  was  officially
sanctioned.49 Unrestrained  improvisation  substituted  for  any  serious  advance  in  the
construction  process.  When  a  new  director  was  sent  in  directly  from  Moscow  in
September 1932, he summarized his first impressions with the statement that the Vakhsh
Project was an “ideal example and wonderful role model of how not to build.” According
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to him, construction “moved forward tentatively like a blind man” and was characterized
by “lack of method, disorganization, sloppiness, and excursiveness.” Despite two years of
building, the “most difficult and complex work” was “yet ahead.”50
23 The new director of the Vakhsh Project, Ivan Aleksandrovich Tolstopiatov, was the right
man in the right place. Born in 1892, the trained machine operator had built a career in
the Soviet Ministry of Labor and, in 1928, climbed to the position of Deputy Minister. In
1930, however, he had to quit the job, officially “due to illness.”51 In 1932, at the age of
forty,  Tolstopiatov had regained his energy. Being both a committed Bolshevik and a
capable industrial manager, he represented a rare type of Soviet official in Tajikistan. His
knowledge of the Soviet state bureaucracy as well as his resolute and assertive behavior
set  him  apart  from  his  predecessors  and  colleagues.  He  ignored  the  downtrodden
atmosphere on the construction site,  which he likened to a “prison camp or place of
forced exile” where “convicts and sinners on parole” worked side by side with “swindlers,
thugs, and other vermin.” In the Vakhsh Valley, Tolstopiatov encountered only a “very
small stratum of people” that “shouldered all the responsibility” and, unlike the majority,
worked “not out of fear but out of good conscience (ne za strakh, a za sovest´).”52
24 Fear was a natural reaction to the life‑threatening conditions in the valley. In the autumn
of 1932,  malaria returned on a grand scale and the region suffered from a plague of
locusts; typhus spread, and the secret police continued its hunts for starving refugees
from Kazakhstan, Tajik resettlers on the run, as well as active and former anti‑Soviet
rebels.53 Climatic conditions were rough during the 1932‑1933 winter of starvation. Still,
production targets had to be met. The Tajik government had lowered the original plan to
cultivate 50,000 hectares of cotton by 1933 to 24,500 hectares. Tolstopiatov reported that
17,600 hectares  could  be  sown  in  spring  only  if  a  number  of  “uncertainties”  were
resolved. (Since 1929 the size of arable irrigation land in the valley had decreased by a
staggering 12,000 hectares.)54 As  a  consequence of  failure,  the party organized public
show trails while the secret police combed the valley in search of “anti‑Soviet elements.”
55 Attempting to make progress on his assignment, Tolstopiatov willingly collaborated
with the secret police. The well‑paid and well‑fed OGPU troopers were the only available
resource to protect vital transport facilities, organize food deliveries, and successfully
supply 2,000 forced labor camp inmates who served as a welcome and cheap source of
manpower.56
25 The 1933 construction season in the Vakhsh Valley began as a wave of state terror hit
Tajikistan. Karl Bauman, the Chairman of the Central Asian Bureau of the Communist
Party  in  Tashkent,  specifically  targeted  Tajik  indigenous  functionaries.  Allegedly,
secretive “nationalistic organizations” were “uncovered.” In April 1933, Stalin granted
Bauman  permission  to  operate  a  special  tribunal  (troika)  with  the  right  to  execute
suspected “insurgents and counter‑revolutionaries in Central Asia.”57 The tribunal ceased
its bloody operations after three weeks, but Bauman continued his campaign of terror
into  the  summer:  state  ministers  in Stalinabad  were  prohibited  from  using  their
telephones or sending telegrams.  Up to 600 Tajik party and state functionaries  were
arrested. Bauman did not rest until the influential Chairman of the Executive Committee,
Nusratullo Maksum, and the Tajik Prime Minister, Abdurahim Khodzhibaev, who were
already under strict secret police surveillance, were relieved from their posts by Stalin in
the fall of 1933.58
26 To fend off the swirl of terror, Tolstopiatov began securing special powers and privileges,
as  a  means  of  making  the  Vakhsh  Project  more  independent  from  its  superior
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organizations  in  Stalinabad  and  Tashkent.  The  director  was  able  to  attain  financial
autonomy, decision‑making powers over the development of local infrastructure, and the
management  of  agricultural  colonization.  In  return,  he  was  required  to  ensure  the
successful  completion  of  the  construction  scheme.59 This  assignment  presented
unexpected  difficulties  and  unknown  surprises.  In  1931  and  1932,  engineers  and
agronomists  had realized that  the location of  the main sluice had been chosen “not
entirely felicitously” and that the construction plan was “not sufficiently thought out and
worked through.” One year before construction work was scheduled to be finished, the
director  and his  staff  knew very precisely  that  the core objects  of  the scheme were
ill‑conceived and premature. Hurried planning and the unfamiliarity of the engineering
team (under Gorton’s supervision), with the terrain, combined with the local ecological
conditions,  produced  a  first  negative  result.  Regardless  of  his  doubts,  Tolstopiatov
fatalistically reasoned that “in the current situation there is no turning back because it is
already too late.”60
27 The construction proceeded incessantly until the last days of August 1933. Despite the
fact that it was not carried out by the “best shock brigades with the strongest of workers”
but  by  “local  indigenous  laborers  unaccustomed  to  hard  work,”  Tolstopiatov was
confident enough to guarantee that the main sluice would be completed and exploitation
could begin by October 1933.61 Behind the scenes, however, conflict ripened. The Vakhsh
River Valley Project’s chief engineer, Sergei Ivanovich Syromiatnikov, could regularly be
seen  arguing  with  workers  instead  of  “quietly  explaining  to  them  their  duties  and
requirements.” Tolstopiatov complained that the inspection trips of the “difficult” and
“pigheaded” chief engineer usually ended in “fights and yelling.” At the same time, he
accused Syromiatnikov of displaying “contempt” towards young engineers and noted that
“his behavior and manners aroused the wish in many of the engineering personnel to
quit their job.”62
28 Tolstopiatov’s personal dislike of his chief engineer was fed by suspicion. Born in 1886,
Syromiatnikov  had  been an  aspiring  and capable  irrigation  engineer  in  Central  Asia
during the 1910s and 1920s. Shortly after he turned forty, however, he was arrested and
subsequently presented as one of the main culprits in the 1928 show trial against the
Central Asian Water Administration in Tashkent. Two months before the beginning of the
much publicized Shakhty trial in Moscow, Syromiatnikov was indicted in Tashkent along
with a dozen fellow “bourgeois” engineers and convicted to five years in prison.  Yet
luckily for him, his prison term ended after a couple of weeks and he returned to his
former workplace as if nothing had happened.63 The experience of becoming a Soviet
engineer had shaped Syromiatnikov’s personality without remaking him into a Soviet
new  man.  Still,  the  Bolshevik  Great  Leap  Forward  heavily  relied  on  engineers  like
Syromiatnikov. The “old guard” of “bourgeois” engineers had not disappeared from the
scene in the late 1920s but instead found itself in the eye of the storm at the landmark
Stalinist shock construction sites throughout the 1930s.64 
29 Tensions  between  Syromiatnikov  and  Tolstopiatov  mounted  as  their  collaboration
approached completion. The last and risky step was the demolition of the cofferdam (an
auxiliary  construction  82 meters  in  length  and  7 meters  high,  which  shielded  the
excavation pit from the river waters). Despite having sought advice from Moscow and
Italian  experts,  the  construction  team  and  its  director  could  not  find  an  agreeable
solution  to  the  following  dilemma:  how to  calculate  the  right  amount  of  explosives
needed  to  detonate  the  cofferdam  without  also  destroying  the  main  sluice.  For  six
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months,  expert  reports  circulated  between  the  Vakhsh  Valley  and  the  responsible
agencies  in  Moscow’s  Ministry  of  Agriculture.  By  August,  Tolstopiatov  decided  to
circumvent the stiff  bureaucratic procedures and act  at  his  own discretion.  Engineer
Syromiatnikov, for his part, grew increasingly worried about the negative consequences
of this decision.65
30 Disasters  were  part  and  parcel  of  Soviet  shock  construction  and  had  dreadful
consequences both for Soviet workers and Soviet engineers.66 Syromiatnikov had learnt
his lesson the hard way in 1928: in the world of the Soviet judiciary, responsibility was
attributed to the failure of individuals rather than to the failure of state institutions.
Despite  the  careful  preparation  of  the  demolition  operation  under  Tolstopiatov’s
supervision,  on August 31,  1933—a day before the scheduled demolition—an explosive
device detonated ahead of time and tore a deep hole in the cofferdam. Twelve days of
emergency work “under the most difficult and sometimes life‑threatening conditions for
the  workers”  were  necessary  to  seal  off  the  damaged  cofferdam.  When  faced  with
disaster, Tolstopiatov and Syromiatnikov followed different strategies of action. While
Tolstopiatov struggled like a  Bolshevik,  Syromiatnikov was paralyzed by fear.  At  the
height of the emergency, Tolstopiatov finally fired his “cowardly” chief engineer. The
latter was allegedly overheard asking members of the engineering team, “Why do you
follow Tolstopiatov? He is a powerful man. If the operation fails, he will sneak out. But we
will end up in the clink.”67
31 At  last,  the  cofferdam was  successfully  demolished.  The  sluice  and canal  opened on
September 12, 1933. Nevertheless, few people on the construction site were in the mood
to celebrate. Due to the continuing purges in Tajikistan and the beginning of the cotton
harvest, state and party officials from Central Asia skipped the grand opening. No official
speeches were delivered, no flags were waved, and no portraits of the leadership were on
display. Meanwhile, the workers were starving and sick. Even at the height of the shock
construction campaign, food deliveries to the valley had been irregular, which led to an
“unsatisfactory provisioning of  the workforce” and the “factual  breakdown of  public
feeding.” Pappataci  fever and malaria occurred “on a massive scale.”68 One Bolshevik
battle was won, but several new fronts opened up immediately.
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Fig.1: Opening Ceremony at the Vakhsh Canal Main Sluice, September 12, 1933
 
Natural forces
32 The opening of the main irrigation canal was the beginning of a descent into nature’s
hell.  The  lack  of  food  and  the  abundance  of  disease  led  half  of  the  5,000 families
(originating  from  Uzbekistan,  Kazakhstan,  and  the  Tajik  mountain  areas)  who  were
resettled  by  force  in  1933  to  return  to  their  regions  of  origin  or  take  refuge  in
Afghanistan.69 Those who had no choice and stayed behind faced a harsh winter in the
severe continental climate of the valley. The party committees and the secret police were
aware that 
many kolkhozes, especially those made up of resettlers, had exclusively cultivated
cotton and melons and, for that reason, start the year of 1934 without fodder and
seeds, and with only minimal amounts of grain that they received in exchange for
cotton.70
33 Tolstopiatov was wise enough to pretend that difficulties did not exist. When he delivered
his  official  report  to  a  plenary  session  of  the  Central  Asian  Bureau  in  Tashkent  in
November 1933,  he  talked  at  length  about  the  “absolutely  satisfactory  results  with
irrigation on the reclaimed lands” while he did not mention during his report that “over
long periods of  time,  resettlers did not even have the possibility to receive drinking
water.”71 Planners, experts and party officials in Tashkent were, however, acutely aware
of the bitter and deadly struggles at the Vakhsh River. “In view of their current state,
none of  the large‑scale irrigation objects  in Central  Asia will  deliver any meaningful
results  in  the  years  to  come,”  an  internal  report  by  the  Central  Asian  Water
Administration concluded in late 1933, “even under the condition of an exceptionally
energetic  state  funding.”72 Accordingly,  the  responsible  government  agencies  scaled
Wildscapes In Ballyhooland
Cahiers du monde russe, 57/1 | 2016
11
down large construction schemes and turned to smaller but better manageable irrigation
ventures.73 Still, what was to become of the prestigious Vakhsh Valley Project once it was
in operation?
34 The  future  looked  bleak.  In  December  1933,  Tolstopiatov’s  deputy  reported  that  the
recruitment of seasonal construction workers was becoming more difficult “year in and
year  out.”  Workers  usually  came  in  from  Tashkent  late  in  the  fall  and,  after  their
three‑month contracts  ended,  returned to their  villages for  spring sowing,  which,  as
officials complained, “inevitably leads to difficult working conditions in the wintertime
and drives  up construction costs.”  Meanwhile,  the permanent  settler  population was
difficult to keep in check and did nothing to hide its resentment towards the Soviet state.
Vakhsh  officials  recognized  that  the  persistent  lack  of  organization  and  workforce,
construction materials and spare parts, clothing and housing, firewood and fuel, “put a
question  mark  behind  the  effectiveness  of  all  future  plans.”74 Many  Soviet  shock
construction projects were in a comparable state of crisis. In contrast to earlier years,
engineers and officials were allowed to discuss the ongoing crisis more openly. They were
still  expected,  however,  to come up with viable solutions that  would guarantee plan
fulfillment.75
35 Deprivation,  shortages  and  lack  of  manpower  had  diverted  the  attention  of  Vakhsh
officials and agricultural experts from their most powerful enemy: the turbulent river
and its relentless waters. The original purpose of the irrigation scheme had been to reign
in  the  mountain  stream and  use  its  waters  for  irrigation.  In  spring  1934  when  the
powerful river floods began pouring onto the wide and deserted valley plateau at a pace
of 200‑250 cubic meters per second, the serious defects of the main sluice and the feeder
canal became apparent. The sluice’s main defect proved that it was not a dam. With a
length of 55 meters and a width of 40 meters, it allowed for the inflow of river water only
after  the water  had reached sufficiently high levels.  Given the 500 meter‑wide range
where  the  river  bed  meandered by  the  site  of  the  sluice,  the  necessary  levels  were
unlikely to be reached.  Unlike a dam, the sluice could not effectively regulate water
volume, as it was neither able to store water nor to effectively control its velocity. It also
lacked an antechamber, which could have filtered out sediments and thus prevented silt
and sand from entering the main canal and clogging the smaller field canals.76
36 The second menace  of  the  irrigation  scheme was  the  misaligned main  feeder  canal.
Stretching over a distance of 12 kilometers, the feeder cut through bedrock at a depth of
12 meters. This allowed massive amounts of river water to seep into the ground, causing
the groundwater table to rise dramatically. In addition, watertight soil layers close under
the ground surface transported water over long distances into the valley,  leading to
excess water, salination, and undercutting of soil stability. Furthermore, the oversized
main feeder canal exposed the irrigated lands to unchecked flooding, since the sluice
construction proved ineffective at stemming the sudden tidal waves of the Vakhsh River.
Severe floods regularly haunted the irrigation system until the mid‑1960s. The forceful
floodwaters also washed away the light loess soils of which the field irrigation canals had
to  be  built.77 Rising  groundwater  tables  and  excess  water  led  to  high  levels  of  soil
salination which,  in turn,  became a major hindrance to land reclamation and cotton
cultivation. According to official statistics, 50 per cent of the virgin lands of the Vakhsh
Valley were either solid salt fields or marshes in 1939.78
37 The final blow occurred when an earthquake hit the upper part of the Vakhsh Valley in
1935. While experts had been aware of seismic activity in the Pamir Mountains, they had
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no  possibility  to  foresee  the  precise  consequences  of  such  an  event.  They  had,
nevertheless, as early as 1932 found fault with the “not entirely felicitous” choice of the
sluice’s location. The 1935 earthquake proved them right by causing a shift in the river
bed at just the point where the main sluice was positioned. Suddenly, the bulk of the river
water passed by the sluice because it  now stood parallel  to the new river bed.  Sand
islands,  sometimes  growing to  four  meters  in  height,  prevented the  inflow of  water
through the sluice into the main feeder canal. The sand had to be continuously removed
by workers in difficult and dangerous manual labor. Engineers had to employ massive
makeshift wooden auxiliary constructions to divert at least some amount of flowing river
water towards the main sluice. Due to the diminished inflow of moving water into the
irrigation system, the field canals, in turn, became clogged with sediment. At the same
time, rising groundwater tables led to the formation of lakes and swamps in large parts of
the valley. In 1937 the construction of drainage canals was hurriedly initiated, but these
flat, hand‑dug canals were quickly silted closed, rendering the measure ineffective.79
38 Rather than the mountain river being tamed, it was the river that brought the Bolsheviks
to heel in the Vakhsh Valley. The combination of irregular water supplies and the soft
alluvial  soils  further  aggravated  the  situation,  as  the  valley  soil  proved  extremely
sensitive to water. On the one hand, alluvial soils can hold great amounts of pore water
which, under solar radiation, is transported through the soil particles to the surface by
capillarity. As a consequence, the surface soils become desiccated and salinized. On the
other hand, alluvial soils can lose their stability when coming into contact with water.
They collapse. In the Vakhsh Valley, strong and uncontrollable streams of water both on
the  surface  and  underground  permanently  undermined  soil  stability.  This  had
devastating consequences. “You see someone standing in the field, watching over the
cotton  being  watered,”  an  eyewitness  remembered,  “and  suddenly  that  person
disappears.” When the soil  imploded, it  left sinkholes of several meters in width and
depth.  Collapsing  soils  and  quicksand  swallowed  and  buried  livestock,  tractors  and
people. Each and every year during the irrigation and field work period in spring and
summer, people died in sinkholes. This was such a widespread occurrence that people
began only entering the fields if they had two to three meter‑long sticks firmly tied to
their backs as a means of saving themselves from a horrible death by quicksand.80
 
State of chaos, world of disorder
39 Thirty years ago, historian Moshe Lewin famously labeled the Soviet Union a “quicksand
society.” His memorable phrase referred to the permanent movement of state officials,
workers, and peasants from one workplace, office, or town in favor of another. According
to Lewin, Soviet people developed the “habit of leaving in good time, before they were
penalized, recalled, brought in for questioning, downgraded, fired, or arrested.” From his
observation,  Lewin  developed  two  compelling  conclusions:  first,  that  “social,
administrative, industrial, and political structures were all in flux,” and second, that it
was “not difficult to imagine the despair of the rulers and their fierce resolution to put an
end to this situation and introduce law and order into the chaos.”81 In the Vakhsh Valley,
however,  there  was  little  evidence for  the  “despair  of  the  rulers”  or  their  desire  to
“introduce law and order into the chaos.” On the contrary, decisions made by the Moscow
leadership consolidated and deepened the crisis situation. Moreover, Stalinist governance
intentionally prevented the emergence of stability and order.
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40 In  October 1934,  Stalin  commanded  the  Politburo  member  Valerian  Vladimirovich
Kuibyshev to travel  to Central  Asia with the assignment of  “putting pressure on the
cotton harvest campaign.”82 Weakened by heart disease and his longstanding alcoholism,
Kuibyshev arrived in Tashkent on November 5, 1934. During his seven‑week peripatetic
tour of Central Asia, Kuibyshev spread death and terror wherever he went. Public show
trials, special tribunals (troiki), and random executions helped the old Bolshevik to boost
the cotton harvest yields. He regularly informed Stalin about his actions.83 Despite his
pressured schedule, Kuibyshev found the time to spend three full days in the Vakhsh
Valley.84 When  the  Politburo  met  to  discuss  the  results  of  his  trip  in  March 1935,
Kuibyshev had already passed away (he died on January 25, 1935). For the Vakhsh Valley
and its people, however, a new chapter had opened: Stalin had begun to take a personal
interest in the project.
41 Under the direction of the General Secretary, the Politburo declared that the colonization
of the Vakhsh Valley had progressed “at an impossibly slow pace” and that “to this date,
the  majority of  the  resettlers  (kolkhozniki‑pereselentsy)  were  economically  unviable
(lack  of  housing  and  so  on).”  Stalin’s  solution  to  the  dilemma  was  to  order  the
resettlement  of  12,000 new “households” to  the valley between 1935 and 1937 (4,000
annually of which 3,000 should originate from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, respectively,
while 6,000 would be “special settlers from other parts of the USSR”). Twelve million
rubles were handed out to the authorities in the Vakhsh Valley to cover the cost of
accommodation, provision, and preliminary credits. Additionally, the Politburo granted
resettlers exemption from all taxes and deliveries for the period of five years—“with the
exception of cotton.” The colonization campaign was to be “overseen directly” by the
NKVD and was to begin immediately.85
42 To the Tajik Party leadership, the colonization campaign came as a surprise. Unaware of
the  discussions  in  the  Politburo  and  unused  to  deportations  of  people  from outside
Central Asia into their mountain fiefdom, they were unprepared and overwhelmed by
Stalin’s  decision.  Tolstopiatov  declared  that  the  Vakhsh  Project  had  no  virgin  lands
available to accommodate large numbers of deportees. The Stalinabad party leadership
hurriedly organized a government commission which was made responsible for supplying
the deportees with basic necessities (building materials, fuel, food, cows, horses, and “at
least 1,000 buckets, 1,000 cups, and 1,000 washstands”). On April 10, 1935, the commission
members were met with yet another surprise when Moscow informed them that the
actual  number  of  new  arrivals  would  exceed  the  originally  announced  figure  of
2,000 deportees. In fact, between early April and mid‑May, 4,895 people arrived in the
Vakhsh Valley. This “special contingent” of future colonizers was a raw product of Soviet
penal policies. It consisted of 315 German Mennonites from the Uzbek region of Khorezm,
350 former inmates  of  the Sazlag labor camps in Uzbekistan,  and 408 prisoners  from
Karaganda. The most unexpected and numerically significant addition were 3,822 “special
settlers” (890 “households”) from Leningrad.86 Ironically, resettlers and deportees arrived
in a borderland region with an enhanced internal security and passport regime. Periodic
cleansing  campaigns  and the  subsequent  deportation of  former  deportees  were  thus
regular occurrences.87
43 Stalin closely monitored the colonization effort. What is more, his arbitrary decision to
choose  the  Vakhsh Valley  as  a  dumping  site  for  large  numbers  of  “special  settlers”
mocked Tajik party officials. Despite desperate pleas from the Tajik First Party Secretary,
Suren Shadunts, to slow down the pace of the campaign, Stalin urged instead to speed up
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the deportations.88 He was neither interested in local conditions nor was he bothered by
the consequences of his orders.89 Thus, in the spring of 1936, 2,734 “households” from
Uzbekistan and the northern parts of Tajikistan were brought into the Vakhsh Valley.
Additionally,  the  NKVD  dumped  1,902 “households”  of  deportees  from  Russia.  To
appreciate  these  figures,  one  should  keep  in  mind that  only  8,307 “households”  had
peopled  the  valley  as  of  January 1,  1935.90 Complaints  on  the  part  of  the  Vakhsh
authorities  did  nothing  to  calm the  determination  of  the  NKVD,  which  “insisted  on
continuing the resettlement of special settlers in the Vakhsh Valley” on Stalin’s behalf.91
According  to  official  calculations,  during  the  period  from  1933  to  1938,  a  total  of
12,434 “households”  originating  from outside  Tajikistan  were  moved  into  the  valley.
Stalinist colonization, moreover, did not stop when the targeted numbers were met in
1938 but continued on a massive scale until 1954.92
44 Meanwhile, Central Asian leaders in Stalinabad and Tashkent had no illusions about the
fact that the fragile and dependent economy of the Vakhsh Valley did not allow for the
accommodation  of  thousands  of  people  who  had  no  prior  experience  in  cotton
cultivation.  Consequently,  government  officials  encouraged  the  diversification  of
economic activities in order to allow deportees to feed themselves independently of the
state provisioning system. When resettlers and deportees started arriving in the valley in
1935,  they  were  urged to  engage  in  horticulture  and handicrafts,  to  set  up  “fishery
kolkhozes,” or to work as private traders on the local market.93 For a group of “special
settlers” who arrived in early 1936, Tolstopiatov and his team were obligated to provide
building  materials  and  food  and  to guarantee  the  “reclamation  of  300 hectares  of
irrigated land, where they will be settled, for the cultivation of vegetables and foodstuffs
for the needs of the special settlers.”94 No one talked anymore about the need to grow
more cotton.
45 On the other hand, the Stalinabad government announced measures that aimed at an
ethnic division of the colonization administration: while Tajik state institutions assumed
the task of monitoring the “voluntary” resettlers of Central Asian ethnic origin, the NKVD
was to provision and administer Russian and Ukrainian “special settlers.” Accordingly,
the secret police was put in charge of organizing shelter, food, and medical care as well as
land surveying, reclamation work, and canal maintenance.95 This ethnographic approach
allowed  the  Tajik  leadership  to  shed  responsibility  for  large  parts  of  the  colonist
population. Simultaneously, however, it institutionalized the perilous living conditions
and  economic  deadlock  in  the  valley,  which  was  now  being  administered  by  three
different sets of institutions: the Vakhsh River Valley Project (overseen by the Soviet
Ministry of  Agriculture),  the Tajik party and state institutions,  and the Resettlement
Administration of the NKVD.
46 At  first  glance,  this  institutional  arrangement  seems  to  point  to  a  centralized,
bureaucratic and modern state. A closer look reveals parallel structures, mushrooming
institutions, loss of control, and the unclear allocation of responsibility.96 The outcome
was a wretched administrative chaos with instable, illegitimate, and irresponsible state
institutions.  Throughout  the  1930s  and  1940s,  reports  called  attention  to the
disorganization of resettlement and the hardships of colonization in the Vakhsh Valley.
Reports repeated that supposedly “voluntary” resettlers from Central Asia experienced
much coercion and violence; that they arrived too late in the agricultural year to produce
a sufficient harvest to feed themselves; that they suffered from malnutrition and disease;
that they lacked housing, water, and fuel; and that they fled the pitiful living conditions
Wildscapes In Ballyhooland
Cahiers du monde russe, 57/1 | 2016
15
whenever they could.97 Not even the severe hunger in Tajikistan in May 1945,  about
which  Stalin  was  well  informed,  prevented  the  continuation  of  the  relentless
resettlement campaign.98 There is no evidence of the “despair of the rulers and their
fierce resolution” to “introduce law and order into the chaos.”  On the contrary,  the
“quicksand society” was fuelled by decisions made in Moscow to deport and resettle large
numbers of people—in full awareness of the deathly living conditions and the ongoing
ecological crisis in the Vakhsh Valley.
47 Law and order in a blossoming cotton garden was a far cry from the realities of the
Vakhsh Valley. This became apparent during the years of the so‑called Great Terror. The
first victim to fall prey to the purges was the Vakhsh Project’s prominent director Ivan
Tolstopiatov, who was arrested as a “counterrevolutionary Trotskyite” in August 1936.99
Tolstopiatov’s ousting triggered fierce criticism of his achievements. In March 1937, the
Soviet government finally called for the Vakhsh Valley Project to be “liquidated.” Upon
hearing the news, engineers, agronomists, and colonists started to leave the “quicksand”
valley.  Because of  payment delays,  the soldiers guarding the irrigation infrastructure
unceremoniously abandoned their posts. Contract workers from Tashkent and Stalinabad
ceased to arrive.  In June 1937,  the acting director  of  the project  informed the Tajik
government  about  the  “pending collapse”  of  the  irrigation scheme “within the  next
month or two.”100 Before the liquidation was finalized, however,  the responsible First
Deputy Minister of Agriculture in Moscow, Nikolai Antonovich Paskutskii, was himself
arrested and subsequently “liquidated.”101
48 Engineers and agricultural experts responded to the crisis by raising similar objections to
the  irrigation  scheme  that  had  been  voiced  at  the  initial  stages  of  the  project  in
1932‑1933:  the ineffective  sluice  should be replaced by a  dam,  a  hydropower station
should be installed, the main feeder canal should be improved, and “past mistakes should
not be repeated.”102 In the face of the terror, the engineers’ calls for major improvements
amounted to pitiful  cries  into the wind.  The state  of  affairs  was now fundamentally
different  from previous years.  “Heroes” and “pioneers” of  the recent  past  were now
“saboteurs” and “enemies of the state.”103 Party officials even critically invoked Willard
Gorton’s mundane 1932 warnings about the inevitable failure of the irrigation scheme as
evidence  that  the  “coarse  deviational  enemy work”  of  the  Vakhsh engineers  was  to
blame: “Just think that our specialists were unable to figure out these problems …”104
49 In 1937, fear triumphed over enthusiasm, and anxiety upset belief. The seemingly solid
structures  of  the  Soviet  state  began  collapsing  at  a  breathtaking  speed.  Was  it
disenchantment, an admission of defeat, or a moment of true socialist realism? 
I think that in view of the giant material sums that were invested in the Vakhsh
Valley—stated the incumbent director of the Vakhsh Valley Project, Beliakov, in an
emotional speech—, it would have been possible to create decent living conditions,
a  healthy financial  situation,  and a  functioning infrastructure—but down to the
present  day  there  is  nothing:  hospital  and  school  buildings  collapsed;  we  have
neither schools nor hospitals, and the infrastructure is in shambles.105
50 Along with the irrigation scheme and the many lives of its unhappy builders, the symbolic
landscape of the Soviet state was also falling apart. Since 1936, a statue of comrade Stalin,
produced at a cost of 90,000 rubles, had been waiting to be erected on top of the main
sluice  of  the Vakhsh  irrigation  system.  Despite  reminders  repeatedly  sent  from
Stalinabad to the responsible officials in the Vakhsh Valley, the statue was never put up.
106
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51 Extraordinary violence and unmanaged environmental conditions upset the regular and
continuous administrative work that is the vital fundament of modern state‑building.
Instead, Stalinist governance in the Vakhsh Valley produced a fragmented, conditional
and illegitimate statehood. Under the pale sun of official propaganda, the Soviet First
worlds  were  emerging  as  capital  cities  were  being  reconstructed and new industrial
agglomerations were arising from scratch to shine in the bright light. The Moscow Metro,
Magnitogorsk,  or  the  much‑hailed  industrial  landscape  around  Dneprostroi  filled
contemporaries of the Stalin period with enthusiasm and pride. At the same time, Soviet
Second and Third worlds were emerging. Many places in the Soviet Union were touched
upon  by  the  forces  of  the  Stalinist  governance  through  shock  construction  and
colonization projects yet were not penetrated by enduring, reliable, or legitimate state
structures. In these places, building socialism amounted to suffering and sacrifices but
without  a  happy  end.  On  the  contrary,  the  “quicksand  society”  suffered  from  both
relentless state terror and the unruly powers of nature. The Vakhsh Valley stands out as
an example for the latter category of Soviet spaces.
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ABSTRACTS
Writing the history of yet another Stalinist shock construction site cannot be an end in itself.
Hence,  the article  treats  the story of  the Vakhsh River Valley Project,  a  showcase irrigation
scheme located at the Soviet border with Afghanistan, not merely as a humanitarian, economic
and  environmental  disaster.  While  deprivation  and  fear  were  key  factors  that  hindered
knowledgeable  engineers  and  capable  managers  from  reigning  in  an  unruly  natural
environment,  the  article  scrutinizes  how  Stalinist  political  ambition  and  Soviet  institutional
disorder intertwined with unfavorable environmental conditions which, ultimately, prevented
the irrigation and colonization scheme from succeeding. The imminent collapse of the Vakhsh
Project  in  1937,  thus,  revealed  some  fundamental  limitations  of  Stalinist  governance  in  a
politically and ecologically sensitive borderland. 
Écrire l’histoire d’un autre grand chantier stalinien ne saurait constituer une fin en soi. Aussi
l’auteur  fait-il  le  choix  de  relater  l’histoire  du  Projet  de  la  vallée  de  la  rivière  Vahš,  projet
exemplaire d’irrigation près de la frontière soviétique avec l’Afghanistan, qui n’est pas seulement
un désastre humain, économique et écologique. Alors que la précarité et la peur étaient autant de
facteurs majeurs qui entravaient l’exercice des ingénieurs et des responsables compétents dans
un cadre naturel  incontrôlé,  l’article  examine comment l’ambition politique stalinienne et  le
désordre  institutionnel  soviétique,  cumulés  à  des  conditions  environnementales  défavorables
ont, finalement, abouti à la mise en échec du projet d’irrigation et de colonisation. L’imminence
de la faillite du Projet Vahš en 1937 révèle ainsi quelques-unes des limites importantes de la
gouvernance stalinienne dans une région frontalière politiquement et écologiquement sensible. 
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